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1. Moorean absurdity with higher order beliefs 
G. E. Moore observed that to say,  
 (A) I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did 
    (1942: 543) 
 
or 
 
 (B) I believe that he has gone out, but he has not 
    (1944: 204) 
 
would be ‘absurd’ (1942: 543; 1944: 204). Why is it absurd to believe or say something 
about myself that might be true of me? Why do Moore’s propositions sound like 
contradictions when they aren’t? Moore’s examples typify two different forms of 
proposition, namely 
 (a)  p & I don’t believe that p  
and 
 
 (b) p & I believe that not-p  
 
that are differently absurd to believe or assert (Williams 1982, 1994, 1996). But Sorensen 
(2000: 30) has produced these examples:   
God exists but I don’t believe that I’m a theist 
and  
God exists but I believe that I’m an atheist 
that contain iterated belief operators, as represented by 
 (a1) p & I don’t believe I believe that p 
and 
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 (b1) p & I believe I believe that not-p  
where the superscript denotes the order of iteration. 
 Sorensen observes (2000: 29) that as iteration increases, (a)-type absurdity decreases, 
while (b)-type absurdity does not. Thus with four iterations 
 (a4) p & I don’t believe I believe I believe I believe I believe that p 
seems less absurd to believe or assert than (a1), whereas the absurdity of believing or 
asserting    
 (b4) p & I believe I believe I believe I believe I believe that not-p 
is undiminished. And (a1) or (b1) seem less absurd to believe or assert than (a) or (b). 
 A definition that captures the essence of Moore’s examples is 
 
(MP) Any proposition is Moorean just in case I can only be justifiably criticised as 
irrational in asserting it on the assumption that I believe it.  
 
This accords with our intuitions in diagnosing as Moorean, (a)-type propositions such as   
 I have no beliefs now   
 
as well as (b)-type propositions such as  
 
 Although you invariably think all my opinions mistaken, you are always right 
 
as opposed to  
 I believe that it’s both raining and not 
or 
 I believe and don’t believe that it’s raining.  
As it stands, MP diagnoses (a1) and (b1) as Moorean as well. If I have no way of 
discovering the truth that it’s raining (because I have been incarcerated in a sealed room), 
I might reasonably withhold the belief that it’s raining (by suspending judgement either 
way) without (mistakenly) thinking I believe it’s raining. Thus I cannot be justifiably 
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criticised on the mere assumption that (a1) is true. Likewise I might be perfectly justified, 
not only in (mistakenly) believing that it’s not raining (when my captors fool me with the 
illusion of dry weather), but also in recognising this belief, so the bare truth of (b1) is no 
basis for criticising me either. Yet clearly I commit some epistemic failing in believing 
either.      
 A supplement to my original account of Moorean absurdity identifies the failing: in 
believing (a) or (b) I am not only guilty of the major failing that my belief is self-
falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs but am guilty of a minor failing (of introspective 
non-omniscience or fallibility) as well. When the Moorean belief is iterated, the major 
failing is expunged but the minor failing remains. And as iterations increase, the minor 
failing of (a)-type belief diminishes, unlike that of (b)-type belief.  
 
2. The account of Moorean absurdities 
If I believe (a) or (b), my belief (as opposed to what I believe) is absurd because it is 
either self-falsifying or entails contradictory beliefs. On the highly plausible principle  
(B&)  If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q 
when I believe (a), then I believe that p. But then (a) is false, since its second conjunct is 
false. My belief is self-falsifying, as opposed to a belief in a necessary falsehood. 
Although (a) might be true of me and although I might believe (a), (a) cannot be true of 
me if I believe it. By contrast, I can correctly believe (b), since my belief that p is 
consistent with its second conjunct, but only if I hold contradictory beliefs about p. 
The absurdity of Moorean assertion derives from that of Moorean belief. For I assert 
that p to you just in case I express the belief that p (in other words afford you reason to 
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think I believe that p) with the intention of changing your knowledge or beliefs in a 
variety of ways (for example by letting you know that p or by lying to you that p)1.  
When I express the belief that p by asserting to you that p (rather than muttering in my 
sleep) I offer you reason to think me sincere, by offering you reason to think me a truth-
teller (since truth-telling is a generally reliable sign of sincerity).   
 So by making an assertion I offer you reason to believe that I am a sincere truth-teller, 
in other words, to believe me. When the assertion is Moorean, the offer is worthless.  For 
if you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe that p. 
But if you believe what I say in the second conjunct, in (a) you believe that I don't believe 
that p and in (b) you believe that I believe that not-p. So if you believe me, you must have 
contradictory beliefs in the first case (conclusive grounds for you to refuse to believe 
me), and you must think I have them in the second (conclusive grounds for believing me 
irrational, which if you are charitable, will force you to again refuse to believe me).    
  Moreover, whenever I assert that I believe that p I express a belief that p and whenever I 
assert that I don’t believe that p I express a lack of belief that p.  For in both cases I afford 
you reason to believe that I’m telling the truth, since it is reasonable for you to make the 
experientially undefeated presumption that I am2.  So when I assert (a) what I express is 
that I both have and lack the belief that p and when I assert (b) what I express is that I 
have the belief that p and the belief that not-p. This is precisely what you must believe if 
you are to believe me and precisely what must be the case if I correctly believe what I 
assert. This explains why Moorean assertion is less absurd than Moorean belief. Although 
Moorean beliefs are conclusive signs of irrationality, I may express a Moorean belief that 
I don’t have. It is worse to be guilty of criticism of irrationality than to licence it. 
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 In permitting degrees of justifiable criticism, MP permits degrees of Moorean absurdity. 
In believing (a) I have a self-falsifying belief. In believing (b), I escape this failing only 
by holding contradictory beliefs. Thus my belief in (a) is equally absurd as that in (b) 
because the two criticisms are equally damning. For both types of belief are equally 
useless as guides to the truth. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me in believing that 
(p and I don’t believe that p) would justify me in believing what is then false. Moreover 
any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and 
conversely3.   
3. Supplementing the account 
Both major absurdities contain minor absurdities as well. For if I believe  
 (a)  p & I don’t believe that p 
then by (B&) I believe that p and I believe that I don’t believe that p. In other words, I 
mistakenly think I lack a belief. Psychologically plausible cases of this include self-
deception. For example, my assertion that I don’t believe that women are inferior may be 
sincere because I am blind to the way I treat them. You may be in a better position to 
recognise that my boorish behaviour is the manifestation of the existing belief that I 
sincerely deny having. In the same circumstances I might also sincerely avow a belief 
that women are not inferior, although you can see that I believe they are. Here I believe 
that p and I believe I believe that not-p.  In other words, what I really believe contradicts 
what I think I believe. Given (B&) this is precisely what is true of me if I believe 
 (b) p & I believe that not-p. 
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 Yet again in the same example, although I may sincerely disavow the belief that women 
are inferior, you might recognise that I hold it. Here I believe that p and I don’t believe 
that I believe that p. In other words, I hold a belief that that I fail to recognise. 
 Each of these three beliefs are grounds for the minor epistemic criticism that I do not 
always recognise whether I have a belief or that I am sometimes mistaken about whether 
I have it. In other words I fail a principle of introspective omniscience, 
(IO) If I believe that p then I believe I believe that p and if I don’t believe that p then I 
believe I don’t believe that p 
or fail a principle of introspective infallibility,  
(II) If I believe I believe that p then I believe that p and if I believe I don’t believe that 
p then I don’t believe that p.4 
If I believe that p and I believe that I don’t believe that p, I fail II, since then I would 
both have and lack the belief that p. But this failure is a comparatively mild criticism. If I 
believe that p and I believe I believe that not-p, I fail II on pain of holding contradictory 
beliefs about whether p. And if I believe that p and I don’t believe that I believe that p, I 
fail IO since then I would both have and lack the belief that I believe that p. This again is 
a comparatively mild criticism. 
By contrast, if I believe   
(a1) p & I don’t believe that I believe that p  
then the major failing in (a) is expunged. For if I correctly-believe (a1) then I believe that 
p (in virtue of believing its first conjunct) and I don’t believe that I believe that p (in 
virtue of the correctness of its second conjunct). This explains why a belief in (a1) is less 
absurd than a belief in (a). In believing (a) I commit the major failing of falsifying that 
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belief and also fail to be introspectively infallible. But in believing (a1), I avoid the major 
failing by failing to be introspectively omniscient. Thus I should be judged less harshly. 
Note that even if failing IO or II were an epistemic fault of equal severity as that of self-
falsifying belief or contradictory beliefs, this conclusion would still stand, since any fault 
becomes bigger if it contains any other.  
Similarly, if I believe that  
(b1) p & I believe that I believe that not-p  
then the major failing in (b) is expunged. For if I correctly-believe (b1) then I believe that 
p (in virtue of believing its first conjunct) and I believe that I believe that not-p (in virtue 
of the correctness of its second conjunct). This explains why a belief in (b1) is less absurd 
than a belief in (b). In believing (b) I must either falsify that belief or hold contradictory 
beliefs. But in believing (b1), I may avoid both major faults by failing to be 
introspectively infallible. 
 The supplemented account also explains why subsequent iterations only decrease (a)-
type absurdity. If I correctly-believe  
 (a2) p & I don’t believe that I believe that I believe that p 
then I believe that p (in virtue of believing its first conjunct) and I don’t believe that I 
believe that I believe that I believe that p (in virtue of the correctness of its second 
conjunct). In other words, my belief in (a2) avoids self-falsification only if I have a belief 
that I don’t think I believe I have. But if I have this belief then I fail to be introspectively 
omniscient, since recursive application of the first conjunct of IO means that I both have 
and lack the belief that I believe I believe that p.  
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This minor failing is mitigated by the increased complexity of what I fail to believe. The 
mitigation follows from the fact that if I believe that p then I have the ability to think the 
thought that p. Your question, ‘do eels eat glass?’ may make me newly conscious of my 
long-held belief that they don’t, but although I have never had thoughts of glass-eating 
eels before, I have long had the ability to have them. The required ability of thought 
explains why although we may intuitively suppose that a dog has rudimentary beliefs 
about the food in its bowl (which helps us explain its behaviour as it strains at its leash), 
we hesitate to attribute it the belief that it will be beaten in Lent. Clearly it does not have 
the concept of Lent and so lacks the ability to think thoughts of Lent. The requirement 
also explains our difficulty in characterising the beliefs of other species in any fine-
grained way, since it is difficult to specify, using the linguistic expressions of our 
thoughts, exactly what concepts (or derivatively, thoughts) are available to those with 
radically different linguistic capacities and ways of behaving.   
Admittedly, the required ability of thought is challenged by the fact that in one sense I 
can believe things on authority that I do not understand. For example, I may believe an 
authority on physics who assures me that entropy is increasing although I have no idea 
what entropy is. But believing that she has said something true is different from believing 
what she says. Although I don’t believe that entropy is increasing, I do believe that she 
has said something true (although I don’t know what) since although I cannot think 
thoughts of entropy, I can think the thought that by using the word ‘entropy’, she has said 
something true5.   
As my beliefs are iterated in a series, there occurs eventually an iteration complex 
enough to defeat human understanding. In other words, complexity of thought will 
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eventually defeat the first conjunct of IO, not because I lack the concepts embodied in p, 
or lack the concept of belief or of myself, but simply because the iterated thought is too 
complex for me to entertain. Since only God can think thoughts of one-millionth iterated 
beliefs, my failure to obey IO to the same extent shows only that I am less than God-like 
and thus ceases to be much of a criticism at all.  Thus your supposition that I believe that 
p but don’t believe I believe… that p (one you need to withhold the criticism of self-
falsifying belief if you are to believe me) includes the supposition that I lack an iterated 
belief. As iterations increase, the lack becomes excusable enough to cease to count as an 
epistemic fault at all. 
By contrast, if I correctly-believe 
 (b2) p & I believe that I believe that I believe that not-p 
then I believe that p (in virtue of believing its first conjunct) and I believe that I believe 
that I believe that not-p (in virtue of the correctness of its second conjunct). In other 
words, my belief in (b2) avoids self-falsification only if I really have a belief that 
contradicts the belief that I believe I believe I have. Here the required ability of thought 
affords no mitigation with further iteration, since what is iterated (my belief that I believe 
that I believe that not-p) is a belief that I have rather than lack. In other words, your 
supposition that I correctly-believe (b1,000,000), one that you need if you are to believe me, 
already includes your supposition that I have the God-like ability of thought required by a 
one-millionth iterated belief. But for any iteration of (b1) I am guilty of the same criticism 
that I can hold beliefs all of which are correct only if I hold contradictory beliefs. The 
correctness of my nth-iterated belief entails the existence of my belief n-1, the correctness 
of which entails the existence of my belief n-2 … and so on back down the series until I 
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hold contradictory beliefs. So I can only avoid both self-falsification and contradictory 
beliefs in believing (b1) by mistakenly believing I hold a belief (thus failing II and yet 
still having the ability to have thoughts of the content of that mistaken belief). Thus 
further iteration of (b1) does not diminish absurdity.   
 This supplemented account also explains differences in degree of the absurdity of 
asserting iterations of (a) and (b).  Suppose that you believe me when I assert  
(a1) p & I don’t believe I believe that p. 
Since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe that p. 
And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that I don't believe 
that I believe that p. So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I have a belief that I 
fail to recognise. Thus you may make only the minor criticism that I fail to be 
introspectively omniscient. Likewise if you believe me when I assert   
(b1) p & I believe I believe that not-p 
then since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you believe that I believe 
that p. And since you believe what I say in the second conjunct, you believe that I believe 
that I believe that not-p. So if you are to believe me, you must judge that I really hold a 
belief that p that contradicts what I think I believe (in other words, that I fail II unless I 
hold contradictory beliefs about whether p). Given your charity in withholding the 
judgement that I have contradictory beliefs, you may make only the minor criticism that 
I’m not introspectively infallible. In either case, you can only charitably believe me if you 
think I’m not introspectively omniscient or not introspectively infallible.  
   Moreover, since I express these failings in the context of a single assertion, they 
become especially culpable because you have every reason to think that I’m aware of 
 10
them yet still persist in them. Since this is a reason to judge me irrational, you will 
hesitate to believe me in either case if you are charitable.   
Nonetheless my iterated assertions are less absurd than their original counterparts. In (a) 
you can only believe me by sacrificing your own rationality in acquiring contradictory 
beliefs. But in (a1) you can consistently judge that I am aware that I have a specific belief 
that I fail to recognise. And the criticism you must make of me if you believe me when I 
assert (b), that I have contradictory beliefs, is severer than that you may charitably make 
when I assert (b1), that I am aware that I hold a specific belief that contradicts what I 
think I believe. As (a)-type iteration increases, so the absurdity of my assertion decreases. 
That I fail to have a one-millionth-iterated belief in what I really do believe is perfectly 
credible, since neither you nor I can humanly hold such beliefs. My assertion becomes a 
truthful report of psychological limits. By contrast, my credibility in making (b)-type 
assertions is not strengthened by further iteration. Your judgement that I have a belief 
that contradicts what I take myself (over a million iterations) to believe should be that I 
am still at fault to the same degree. My iterated belief still commits me to a belief that is 
iterated one order less, and so on back down the series until I am committed to 
contradictory beliefs. If you believe me when I assert (b1,00,000), you are still in a position 
to see that I can avoid contradictory beliefs only if, somewhere in the series, I take myself 
to have a belief that I don’t in fact have. 
 In conclusion, (a) and (b) are paradigmatically Moorean in the sense that my believing 
them enables the conclusive criticism that I have a self-falsifying belief or one that entails 
contradictory beliefs, one that you are justified in making if I assert them. This can be 
explained by the minimal resource of the success of (B&).  The higher-order absurdities 
 11
are not strictly Moorean in this sense, despite their inclusion in the original absurdities, 
since my belief (and derivatively my assertion) of them enables different criticism in 
terms of the extra resource of the failure of IO or II, until the absurdity in high orders of 
iterations of (a), begins to disappear6. 
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Notes 
1. By contrast, Rosenthal’s account (1995: 197) restricts the expression of belief 
to sincere assertions. This has the unfortunate consequence that ‘if one utters 
something but does not actually have the thought that one’s utterance purports 
to express, that utterance cannot figure in the performing of a genuine 
illocutionary act’ (2002: 169). But surely lies are as much assertions as honest 
announcements. Rather than denying that a lie is a genuine speech act, we 
should say that is it is genuinely the speech act of someone who is not 
genuine. 
2. Rosenthal (2002: 168) denies that my assertion that I believe that p expresses 
my belief that p on the grounds that it reports my belief that p and thereby 
expresses my higher-order belief that I believe that p. In fact it does both. 
When I make an assertion that q, I offer you reason to think I’m telling the 
truth. But when q is my assertion that I believe that p, I thus offer you a reason 
to think I believe that p.  I also offer you reason to think I’m sincere and so 
also express a belief that I believe that p.  
3. Holding a belief that necessarily commits me to falsehood in other ways may 
escape this criticism. For the moral of the so-called ‘preface paradox’ is that I 
am perfectly reasonable in believing that at least one of my beliefs is false, 
despite the fact that believing it commits me to the necessity of at least one 
false belief.  
4. Uriah Kreigel suggested these formulations together with useful criticism. 
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 15
5. A different sort of counterexample arises when I seem to have only a partial 
grasp of the content of my belief. For example, mistakenly thinking that 
arthritis is an inflammation of bones as well as joints, I sincerely utter to you 
‘arthritis has spread to my thigh’. Intuitively we feel that I mistakenly believe 
something to do with arthritis. It is consistent with this that although I don’t 
believe that arthritis has spread to my thigh (because I can’t think thoughts of 
arthritis, since my inability to reliably distinguish cases of arthritis from other 
aliments precludes my grasp of the concept of arthritis embedded in that 
would-be thought) I do believe (mistakenly) that inflammation of the joints 
and bones has spread to my thigh and believe (mistakenly) that what you call 
‘arthritis’ has spread to my thigh.  
6. This paper was written with financial assistance from the Wharton-Singapore 
Management University Research Centre  
 
 
